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استراتيجية الصراع

Theory Game Theory Game

  • Title: استراتيجية الصراع
  • Author: Thomas C. Schelling توماس شيلينج نزهت طيب أكرم حمدان
  • ISBN: 9789953876047
  • Page: 411
  • Format: Paperback
  • 1945 1945 Theory Game Theory Game 1921 1948 1953 2005.

    • ☆ استراتيجية الصراع || ☆ PDF Read by ↠ Thomas C. Schelling توماس شيلينج نزهت طيب أكرم حمدان
      411 Thomas C. Schelling توماس شيلينج نزهت طيب أكرم حمدان
    • thumbnail Title: ☆ استراتيجية الصراع || ☆ PDF Read by ↠ Thomas C. Schelling توماس شيلينج نزهت طيب أكرم حمدان
      Posted by:Thomas C. Schelling توماس شيلينج نزهت طيب أكرم حمدان
      Published :2019-03-25T19:24:21+00:00

    1 thought on “استراتيجية الصراع

    1. This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that not all games are zero-sum. That is, they are 'variable-sum', or dependent upon the strategies used. Not all actors are apparently rational, and some may act on seemingly irrational behavior in order to alter their opponent's responses. On the individual level, this could be the abusive lover threaten [...]

    2. كنت مصاباً بالفرح لما عرفت أن أحد الدور العربية ترجمت هذا الكتاب الرائع ولكني عدت لوضعي الصحيح حيث الفرح هو أمر طارئ في ثقافة بلاد تعترف فقط بكتب الشعر والروايات وتهمل باقي أنواع الكتبووضعني هذا الكتاب في نسخته العربية أما مأزق النجوم فالنسخة الأصلية تستحق على الأقل خمس نجم [...]

    3. النسخة العربية سيئة للغاية فى طريقة ترجمتها وعرض الامثلة ووجد صعوبة بالغة فى فهم كثير من التفاصيل بسبب طريقة الترجمة السيئةانصح بالنسخة الانجليزية الاصلية

    4. [Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]-- Assigned reading for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies, chapters 1-3 & 8 only --This book by Schelling carries the idea of compellence forward into the concept of manipulating the adversary’s percep [...]

    5. A theoretical book about the nature of conflict.The big point was that in conflict the best option is to demonstrate to the enemy that you are physically unable to deviate from your destructive course and thus his only option is to get the fuck out of your way.The beginning and the end were really good but the parts in the middle about game theory and the numbers shit sucked.I also like the implicit negotiation stuff.Quotes:"The essence of these tactics is some voluntary but irreversible sacrifi [...]

    6. If at first this reads like a pop-econ book about counter-intuitive explanations for human transactions, do not stop there. Keep thinking about it.Schelling's description of variable sum games and bargaining seemed overbearing while I was reading it, but as soon as I finished the book I realized having the analysis systematically laid out was very helpful. In particular, I wish I had read this before studying Contracts. Generally, this book gives me a new perspective for explaining the most diff [...]

    7. Great game theory book applicable to Cold War, linear policy theory. Contrast with The Direction of War by Hugh Strachan

    8. TL;DR: Becomes repetitive, but bear with it for the ideas and mode of thinking that kept the world from blowing up while shaking up abstract game theory. No complicated maths involved; just the sheer brilliance of his examples.Pick up a game theory textbook and most of your time will be spent proving theorems about games you can prove theorems about with fixed sums where you minimax and that’s it. Except that’s not how most real-world games go. The real world is complicated, neither fully co [...]

    9. Foundational. I've known for years I should've read this before now. Very worthwhile. If you've ever read anything on deterrence or plan to, stop and read this first.Please enjoy where Schelling states, on the second to last page, that improving the survivability of retaliatory, second-strike forces makes it more possible that the US could use nuclear weapons on a small scale to oppose Russian conventional aggression: "The risk involved in a bit of less-than-massive retaliation should be less th [...]

    10. For a book this old, written by a founder in the field, and fundamental to a range of fields people have put a lot of effort into understanding (nuclear deterrence for example) this book had a lot of surprises. It used game theory to discuss a variety of strategy related issues, including how the fear of surprise attack influences the behavior of two interlocutors. It also had some interesting insights into regular warfare too. War is rarely a completely competitive endeavor, and often requires [...]

    11. Thomas Schelling's work on states' strategic thinking was important in the 1960s. This volume, published in 1960, examines, as the title suggests, "the strategy of conflict." How does the threat of conflict or actual use of violence advance the interests of states? Schelling uses game theory to explore the logic of exploiting potential force in international bargaining situations. This book illustrates strategic thinking in the 1960s.

    12. Classic on the game-theoretical aspects of conflicts, in particular, international relations. E.g. the whole discussion of threats/promises/credibility. It abstracts from actual conflicts, and treats them as a kind of chess game. Insightful.

    13. كتاب جيد يستحق القراءة . انهيتة مع احساس متزايد بالذنب اتجاهة ربما لاننى لم امنحة وقت جيد للقراءةاو ذهن صافى للفهم . ربما اعيد قراءتة مرة اخرى . وهل يستحق كتاب يورث قارئة الشعور بالذنب و التقصير ان يعطية قارئة الاهتمام والقراءة مرة اخرى !!!!!!!

    14. relied heavily on man as a rational actor, a lot of game theory, the only useful concept is "making the pie bigger"

    15. Very interesting book about strategy, both in games and wars. The level is more academic so it require some understanding from the reader.

    16. An inarguable, insightful classic. More readable than I could have hoped, despite the proliferation of illustrative mathematical games

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